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PARTNERSHIP-DEMURRER-FEDERAL PERMITS-JURISDICTION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR-McNulty et al. vs. Kearin
-No. 13986-Decided June 14, 1937-District Court of Huer-
fano County-Hon. A. F. Hollenbeck, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The judgment for review was a decree whereby the court
charged a certain federal coal prospecting permit-standing in the name
of the defendant, McNulty, as executrix under the last will and testament
of Peter Fern, deceased-with a trust, as to a one-half interest therein,
in favor of the plaintiff, Kearin, defendant in error. Fern had been a
co-partner of plaintiff's with a view to the ownership, leasing, prospect-
ing, development and operation of coal lands. In 1925 they jointly
acquired from the United States a coal mining lease on a tract of 240
acres, and in 1927, they jointly procured from the United States a coal
prospecting permit on a tract of 360 acres adjacent to the other tract.
This permit was thereafter renewed, expiring March 5, 1931. About
a week prior to the expiration of the permit, Fern commenced an action
to dissolve the partnership existing between himself and Kearin. On
April 18, 1931, while the action was pending, Fern applied to the
United States for a new coal prospecting permit in his sole name on the
land covered by the original permit granted to him and Kearin jointly.
On June 19, 193 1, Fern died. Fern's application for a new permit was
duly kept alive by proper extensions officially granted for the payment
of the $350.00 reantal, which Kearin claims he eventually paid the gov-
ernment. The defendant requested that the permit applied for by Fern
be issued instead to her. Kearin filed a protest in the land office against
the issuance of such a permit to the defendant, setting forth his claim as
a partner, but the Department of the Interior properly ruled that it has
no jurisdiction over equitable issues and dismissed the protest. The per-
mit received by and in the name of the defendant as executrix was the
property right subjected in the trial court to the declaration of trust that
was complained of.
HELD: 1. All legal and equitable claims of Kearin's were not
finally adjudicated in the partnership dissolution action brought by
Fern because that complaint did not deal in any way with the coal
prospecting permit for which Fern had applied and which was issued-
nearly six months after entry of the decree-to his estate, represented by
the executrix.
2. The overruling of a demurrer for alleged misjoinder of parties
is immaterial, whether it has merit or not, if the defendants plead over,
for it waives any error in connection therewith.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
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OIL AND GAS-NONSUIT-WAGE ACT-ORIGINAL UNDERTAKING-
RATIFICATION-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-The Mayer Oil Com-
pany et a[. vs. Schnepf-No. 14017-Decided June 7, 1937-
County Court of Larimer County-Hon. Albert P. Fisher, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as they ap-
peared in the trial court: Defendant in error as plaintiff, and plaintiffs in
error as defendants. Action was brought by the plaintiff to recover for
services rendered and labor performed by himself and his assignors in
connection with certain oil well drilling operations. At the conclusion
of plaintiff's case the court denied defendant's motion for nonsuit and
defendants elected to stand upon the motion. Judgment was thereupon
entered in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and his assignors were
employed by Mosher, the contractor, to work upon the well, and on
January 24, 1932, he was indebted to them for back wages. The plain-
tiff and his assignors suspended work and refused to continue until they
were paid. Thereupon there was executed an original agreement and
undertaking on the part of the defendant companies to pay the plaintiff
and his assignors for their labor, which was for the purpose of inducing
the men to return to work on the land which the companies were inter-
ested in. The complaint further alleged liability against the defendants
under the provisions of the "wage act" which renders the defendants
liable by operation of law, to employees of a contractor for work done
for the private corporations. The defendants questioned the constitu-
tionality of this act and also contended that plaintiff's cause of action,
in so far as it was based upon said act, was barred by the one-year statute
of limitations.
HELD: 1. A motion for nonsuit admits the truth of the evi-
dence produced by the plaintiff in the sense most unfavorable to the
defendants and every inference of fact legitimately deductible therefrom.
2. The fact that the subsequent payments to the men were made
from the funds of one of the companies might well indicate the promise
was made on behalf of the corporations and ratified by them.
3. When the leading object of the promisor is to subserve some
interest or purpose of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or
discharge the debt of another, his promise is not within the statute.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous, Mr. Justice Hilliard not partici-
pating.
NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY, PER SE-EVIDENCE-STATUTES, IN-
TERPRETATION OF-Grunsfeld vs. Yenter-No. 14088-Decided
June 1, 1937-District Court of Weld County-Hon. Frederic
W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties will be referred to as they were in the trial
court, where the plaintiff, defendant in error, recovered judgment against
the defendant in the sum of $541.50 for personal injuries caused by
defendant's alleged negligent operation of his motor vehicle. About
7:00 o'clock on the evening of July 12, 1935, while the plaintiff was
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driving his automobile in a southerly direction along the Greeley-Denver
highway at a speed of approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour, he ran
into the rear end of the defendant's automobile, which was standing on
the pavement, headed in the same direction. There had been a heavy
shower and defendant had stopped his car during the heaviest part of the
rain. Because of the rain the defendant's car would not start, and he
was sitting in his car trying to start the engine at the time of the impact.
The shoulders along the highway were well graveled and the ditch along-
side of them was not over two feet deep. Plaintiff admitted that he saw
defendant's car about a block and a half away, but assumed that it was
proceeding in the same direction as his own at the usual rate of speed
and states that he did not realize until a few "instants" before the crash
that defendant's car was standing still. The question involved was
whether or not the plaintiff was conclusively guilty of contributory neg-
ligence under Sections 73 (a), c. 122, S. L. 1931, p. 53 2 .
HELD: 1. The courts retain the duty of giving the statute a
reasonable interpretation, because it cannot be maintained that failure to
comply literally with all the provisions of the statute in all circumstances
constitutes negligence per se.
2. "A party suddenly realizing that he is in danger from the
negligence of another is not to be charged with contributory negligence
for every error of judgment when practically instantaneous action is
required."
3. Where the evidence is conflicting, findings thereon will not be
disturbed, since every inference fairly deducible from the evidence is
drawn in favor of the judgment.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
FUTURE INTERESTS-INTERPRETATION OF ISSUE-LATENT AMBI-
GUITIES-WATER RIGHTS -DEEDS -APPURTENANCE-Hasel-
wood us. Moore et al.-No. 13897-Decided June 1, 1937-
District Court of Jefferson County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: In assertion of her rights, claimed by virtue of a vested
remainder, plaintiff in error, as plaintiff below, brought suit in ejectment
against possession under a life estate which had terminated. Complain-
ing that the trial court erroneously determined that she was entitled to
a two-thirds interest only in the land, and to none of certain claimed
water rights, she assigned error to the judgment. She prayed for dam-
ages for the wrongful detention and use of the premises after the termina-
tion of the life estate and was awarded judgment therefor in the sum of
$730.47, to which Alice T. Moore, one of the defendants in error,
assigned cross error. Prior to August 9, 1901, George H. Church was
the owner in fee simple of. certain land. In his lifetime he had much to
do with acquiring water rights and ditches for conveyance thereof in that
particular locality where his land was situated. On the above date he
conveyed the property to his daughter, Mary C. Tucker, by quitclaim
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deed, which on its face clearly conveyed a life estate to Mary C. Tucker
with remainder to her issue, if any. If no issue, the property to revert
to the grantor or his heirs. He did not say, "children living at the time
of her death" or "children living at the time of the execution of the
deed." His deed was silent in respect to water rights, but it did make
a reservation from the conveyance of land occupied by a lake or such
land as might be occupied by future enlargements, and a special reser-
vation of the land covered thereby, and for a right of way for an irri-
gating ditch crossing the land. On the death of Mary C. Tucker the
property descended to her two living children, Alice T. Haselwood and
Alfred R. Tucker, and to the heirs of Eleanor Tucker Truder, who
predeceased Mary. These latter children, heirs of Eleanor, claim a one-
third interest in and to the property. After the death of Mary, Alfred
C. Tucker, her son, quitclaimed his interest in the land to his sister,
Alice T. Haselwood. Plaintiff contends that she thereby became en-
titled to the entire remainder of the lands, upon the theory that it was
the grantor's intention that the remainder rest only in children of, and
surviving, Mary C. Tucker at the time of her death. She also contends
that under the "appurtenance" clause of the deed the grantor intended to
and did convey 5 0 inches of water with the land.
HELD: 1. Findings on the facts upon disputed questions will
not be disturbed on review.
2. The deed contains no latent ambiguities, and therefore leaves
no room for oral testimony in explanation thereof or to vary its terms.
3. Under the terms of the deed issue meant children and children's
children.
4. The court will not by implication do for a grantor that which
was easily within his power to so express and grant.
5. There was no conveyance of any water by the deed and it was
not sufficiently shown that any water ever was used on the land, so as to
bring it within the category of an appurtenance.
6. Any arrangement or agreement to take possession of the prem-
ises and receive the rents and profits, could exist no longer than the life
estate of the party granting such privilege.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
SUPREME COURT RULE No. 32-ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR--Smookler
vs. Nicoll Bros. Oil, Inc.-No. 14107-Decided June 7, 1937-
County Court of Denver-Hon. George A. Luxford, Judge-
Affirmed.
HELD: That the assignments of error: "that judgment is contrary
to the law" and "that judgment is contrary to the evidence," are no
compliance with Supreme Court Rule No. 32 and present nothing for
review.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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TORTS-DAMAGES, MINIMIZING-GRATUITOUS HOSPITALIZATION-
FAMILY CARE-City of Englewood vs. Bryant-No. 14018-
Decided May 24, 1937-District Court of Arapahoe County-
Hon. S. W. Johnson, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought action against the city, claiming dam-
ages in the sum of $400 for medical attendance, hospitalization and
nursing, plus $5,000 for physical injuries, pain and suffering, all occa-
sioned by a fall on a defective sidewalk. On a verdict in her favor for
$2,700, judgment was entered. To review that judgment the city
prosecuted error.
HELD: 1. It is the duty of the injured party to minimize dam-
ages by reasonable care and obedience to medical directions if circum-
stances are such as to make it possible to do so.
2. Where an injured person has been cared for gratuitously by a
hospital belonging to the county and state, and her possible liability for
this care, to the state, is so remote as to be purely speculative, she will
not be allowed to recover this expense from the defendant.
3. Where the injured party has been cared for by her mother, the
city cannot claim the benefit of her mother's gratuitous service, but must
pay for the services so rendered.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
EQUITY-TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY-CAPACITY-
BURDEN OF PROOF-Burton et a[. vs. Burton et al.-No. 14030
-Decided June 1, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. H. E.
Munson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: This was a suit brought in equity to set aside certain
transfers of property made by Burton to the defendants before his death.
This was a case of an elderly, ill, but as the evidence brought out, men-
tally competent man, still hoping and expecting recovery, concluding to
finally dispose of his property, and deliberately choosing between a wife
in name only, of some twenty months, whom he did not greatly trust,
and adult children by a former marriage, whom he loved and trusted.
The wife's case rested primarily upon the alleged mental incapacity of
her husband. The trial court found against her and gave defendants
judgment for costs.
HELD: 1. The burden of proof to show alleged improper influ-
ence is upon he who asserts it.
2. Blood relationship alone is insufficient to support a claim of
special trust and confidence so as to place the burden of proof upon the
defendants.
3. The Supreme Court assumes the correctness of the findings of
fact made on conflicting evidence by the trial court.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
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WILLS - TESTAMENTARY TRUST- EQUITABLE CONVERSION- IN-
TEREST METHOD OF DETERMINING AVERAGE INVESTMENT AND
NET PERCENTAGE INCOME-In re: Estate of Fred Herrington,
deceased. Donaldson, etc. vs. Herrington, etc.-No. 13935-
Decided June 21, 1937-County Court of Denver-Hon. George
A. Luxford, Judge-Modified and Affirmed.
FACTS: Herrington, testator, bequeathed the sum of $30,000 in
trust for the use and benefit of two nieces. The bequest provided that
the sum be invested in income-bearing securities and that the income be
paid over to the beneficiaries, and that trustee be at liberty to use any
part or all of the principal necessary for the maintenance and education
of the nieces. The trust fund was not set up or segregated from the
estate, nor were any securities, legal for investment of trust funds, set
aside for the fund. Since the will was admitted to probate, the nieces
have received in excess of $29,000. The newly appointed trustee de-
mands that the executors treat the $30,000 bequest as equitably con-
verted, as of the date of death of the testator, into such securities as are
authorized by statute (Sec. 5269, C. L. 1921), and that the trustee be
paid $30,000 plus whatever income thereon on the unpaid balance at
the rate said converted fund would have earned if it had been converted
into securities legal for investment of trust funds under the laws of
Colorado, less any prior payments made to the beneficiaries or their
trustee. The County Court held that there was an equitable conversion
of the funds and that the interest considered earned would be the same
as the entire estate earned after deducting from the gross income, legal
expenses and executors' fees, in arriving at the net figure used in the
computation of the interest.
HELD: 1. The Colorado statute (Sec. 5269, C. L. 1921) does
not provide for any minimum rate of interest at which funds of a de-
ceased person's estate shall be invested, but enumerates a number of types
of securities, including U. S. Government Bonds, which shall be deemed
legal investments, but the income of such government bonds is not neces-
sarily the legal yardstick to be applied in determining the amount of
income to which the trust fund is entitled.
2. Where it appears that the investments of the estate funds were
not injudicious or ill-advised and it was the undoubted intention of the
executors in the interest of all the beneficiaries that the property of the
estate be so invested, safety considered, as to bring in as large an income
as could be obtained, it is fair and just to use that income as the basis
for the income which should have been derived on the trust fund pro-
vided for in the will.
3. "The rate of interest should be such as a trustee by careful,
conservative investment in suitable trust investments could reasonably
realize as interest or income."
4. In determining the average investment to be used in ascertain-
ing the net percentage income on the estate as a whole, it was not error
for the trial court to include nearly $41,000 worth of nonincome pro-
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ducing items in an estate, such as this, where the average investment was
over $127,000.
5. The items of legal expenses and executors' fees should not
have been deducted from the gross income in arriving at the net for the
purposes of this computation. The expenses of administration are not
chargeable against a money legacy where the residuary corpus is sufficient
to pay such items.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-Mellor et al. vs. Bennet et al.-No. 14036
-Decided June 21, 1937-District Court of El Paso County-
Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where the intention of the testator can be reasonably
learned from an examination of the entire will, such intention must
govern.
2. Will considered and determined that the construction adopted
by the District Court (that the true residuum of the estate begins with
sub-section (3) of Article V of the will, and that all costs of adminis-
tration, including court costs, attorneys' and executors' fees and taxes
must be paid from the assets contained in said sub-section (3) of Article
V, if the assets contained therein are sufficient to pay such charges, and
not out of the specific bequests found in prior clauses in the will) is the
more natural and reasonable one.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
MORTGAGES - TRUST DEEDS - LIENS - PREFERENCE - ASSIGN-
MENTS-GARNISHMENTS-RENTS AND PROFITS-REAL ESTATE
-TRUST DEID AS CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Fisher, etc. us. Nor-
man Apartments et al.-No. 13963-Decided June 21, 1937-
District Court of Denver-Hon. James C. Starhweather, Judge-
Reversed.
FACTS: B executed deed of trust to the International Trust Com-
pany covering certain property on which the Norman Apartments are
now situated securing a bond issue of $350,000. Later the property
was conveyed by B to Norman Apartments, Inc., which assumed and
agreed to pay the encumbrance. Thereafter, a judgment was obtained
against the apartments and assigned to plaintiff. Subsequently, an
agreement was entered into between B, the Norman Apartments, Inc.,
and certain persons constituting a "bondholders' protective committee,"
to have the resident manager, E, of the apartments, continue to collect
rents and manage the apartments and pay into the Colorado National
Bank such funds and to pay the ordinary bills in connection with such
management by check, countersigned by a representative of the bond-
holders' committee, and drawn on such funds. Foreclosure of the Trust
Deed was instituted but no receivership was demanded. After the decree
of foreclosure was entered, execution and garnishment on the judgment
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was issued and garnishee summons served on E and the Colorado Na-
tional Bank, who answered the negative. The International Trust
intervened, claiming the property and funds in the hands of the bank
and E. The plaintiff traversed the answers, and from a judgment on
the traverse in favor of the garnishees and on the petition in intervention
in favor of the trust company, plaintiff prosecutes writ of error.
HELD: 1. The contract was not an assignment of rents. E,
the resident manager, was the agent of the Norman Apartments, Inc.,
and the moneys were collected for the benefit of the Norman Apartments,
Inc., in the manner usual before the execution of the contract, and this
is consistent with possession remaining in the corporation and incon-
sistent with either an assignment of the rents or bills receivable or a
surrender of possession to the bondholders' committee. The contract
was a restriction on expenditures which might voluntarily be made by
the manager, and it did not pass title to the funds or determine the rights
of the judgment creditors to proceed against them for satisfaction of
their claims.
2. The assignment of rents in the trust deed did not give the
mortgagee a right to such rents except under certain definite conditions.
The mortgagors did not abandon possession, nor was a receiver ap-
pointed.
3. A mortgagee before entry has no specific lien upon the rents.
He must first take possession under the mortgage.
4. Even when the mortgage expressly covers the land, "together
with rents, issues and profits," the language will be construed as refer-
ring to rents and profits accruing after entry by mortgagee, in absence
of specific language pledging the rents accruing before default while
mortgagor is in possession.
5. "The contract itself did not constitute a preferred payment;
it was but the means by which a preference was intended later to be
effected." There is a vast difference in law between an order to pay a
debt out of a particular fund and promise to pay out of such fund. " 'An
agreement to pay out of a particular fund, however, clear in its terms, is
not an equitable assignment; a covenant in the most solemn form has no
greater effect. * * * The assignor must not retain any control over the
fund-any authority to collect, or any power of revocation. If he does,
it is fatal to the claim of the assignee.' "
6. Where a trust deed contains a provision that any personal
property owned or thereafter acquired and used by the grantors in the
conduct of a hotel business in the buildings, without specifically describ-
ing it, it is subject to the same rules as a chattel mortgage for as to such
property it is a chattel mortgage, and the personal property must be so
described that it may be identified or possession taken prior to service of
such garnishment-as to such property it was not notice and it was void
as to the judgment creditor.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard not partici-
pating. Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting.
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WATER RIGHTS-PRIORITIES-MAP AND STATEMENT-The San Luis
Roller Mills vs. The San Luis Power and Water Company-No.
13909-Decided June 14, 1937-District Court of Costilla
County-Hon. John I. Paliner, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The action involved a controversy between two claimants
in a general water adjudication.
HELD: 1. As between two rival claimants, both having failed
to come within the exact provisions of the statute, i. e., in not having
filed a map and statement within the period prescribed by statute, the
relative priorities of the claims are properly determined by the dates on
which the particular appropriations were respectively consummated by
actual diversion of the water.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
INSURANCE-TOTAL DISABILITY-USUAL OR ORDINARY WORK-
COMPENSATION FROM WORK AS AFFECTING TOTAL DISABILITY
-Denton vs. The Prudential Insurance Company of America-
No. 13977-Decided April 4, 1937-District Court of Denver-
Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties hereinafter will be designated as plaintiff and
the insurance company. Action brought by plaintiff upon the total dis-
ability clause of a group policy contract of insurance carried by plain-
tiff's employer, and was based on a heart condition which allegedly
caused him to be totally and permanently disabled within the meaning
of the contract. Plaintiff was a collector for the insurance company.
On April 30, 1933, while playing baseball at a Sunday School picnic,
he suffered a heart attack and fainted. Following his illness, the com-
any took some of his territory away and some of his associates helped
im with minor parts of his work, but he continued working with no
decrease in compensation until he was discharged for an alleged shortage
in his accounts on February 9, 1935. At the trial, plaintiff's counsel
offered to show the plaintiff was not short in his accounts, which offer
was denied, and he did not offer any evidence to show that he was dis-
missed on account of his physical condition. At the close of the plain-
tiff's case in the District Court, the insurance company filed a motion
for a nonsuit, which was granted and the action dismissed.
HELD: 1. Total disability does not mean absolute helplessness;
it is enough to meet the requirements of the insurance contract if the
insured is entirely incapacitated for work or business.
2. Contracts of insurance are to be construed most strongly
against the company and liberally construed in favor of the insured, but
the court may not substitute an entirely different contract from that
which the parties have entered into.
3. The insured may not be regarded as totally disabled as of a
time when, although sick, diseased, injured, or otherwise afflicted, he
continues to do his ordinary work, or is regularly performing his usual
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and customary duties. The plaintiff admits continuing his usual work
at substantially the same compensation up until the time of his discharge,
and, therefore, the jury would not have been justified under the law in
rendering a verdict in any amount for the plaintiff.
4. Disability to engage in any occupation and perform any work
for compensation or profit as set forth in an insurance contract contem-
plates that the compensation for profit to be received from the occupa-
tion engaged in, or work done, shall in a fair sense be remunerative, and
not merely nominally so.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
TAXES-TAX-EXEMPT PROPERTY-CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS-
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INCIDENTAL USE OR INCOME-REVE-
NUE-Creel vs. The Pueblo Masonic Building Association-No.
13918-Decided April 4, 1937-District Court of Pueblo County
-Hon. John H. Voorhees, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The association, or plaintiff, brought an action against
Creel in his capacity as County Treasurer of Pueblo County, herein
mentioned as defendant, seeking to enjoin him from selling certain
property of the association for non-payment of taxes, and to remove the
same from the tax roll as exempt from taxation. Plaintiff owned a five-
story building, three floors of which are used for rental purposes and
which are not directly or even indirectly used by the association for any
other purposes than that of producing revenue, the same purpose for
which buildings are owned and maintained by private persons and cor-
porations. The situation presents the question whether an admittedli
charitable organization deriving revenue not merely incidental to the use
and management of property otherwise used for its charitable purposes,
but from property used for the sole purpose of producing revenue to be
used in carrying out such purposes, is entitled to have property so used
exempted from taxation. The case comes under Section 5 of Article X
of the Constitution, and Section 7198, C. L. 1921.
HELD: 1. Whether in any given case property is or is not
exempt, must be determined by considering all of the facts and circum-
stances, and the intentions and purposes of those in charge of the insti-
tution to which the property belongs respecting the use and occupation
of such property.
2. Mere incidental income from property clearly not maintained
for the principal objective of producing income does not take it out of the
exempt class.
3. If the entire property constitutes a unit, and it is reasonably
necessary to effect the objects of the institution, and it is used solely for
that purpose, it is exempt from taxation.
4. In the present case it clearly appears that it does not present a
case of mere incidental use or incidental income from the property other-
wise "reasonably necessary to effect the objects of the institution."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
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CONTRACTS-GIFTS-DRAWING OF A LUCKY NUMBER-Slagle vs.
Construction Progress Exposition-No. 13922--Decided April 4,
1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: Slagle, plaintiff below, sued to replevy an automobile
from the defendant corporation. On a motion a verdict was directed
in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff now seeks reversal. Plaintiff relies
upon the contention that the defendant made a gift to her of the auto-
mobile. The gift is asserted to have been effected through the drawing
of a "lucky number" from among all the numbers received in connection
with admission tickets by the persons visiting the defendant's "fair,"
where numerous merchants exhibited their wares. The automobile was
not to be delivered until the close of the fair. It is admitted that the
fair closed without any delivery being made to the plaintiff.
HELD: 1. No contract right could arise out of the situation
here presented, lacking as it does all the essential elements of a legal
contract.
2. There was no gift, for a gift presupposes an effectual delivery.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
INSURANCE-FAMILY POLICY-MEMBER OF THE FAMILY-EVIDENCE
-ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY-International Service Union Com-
pany vs. Espinoza-No. 13981-Decided April 4, 1937-Dis-
trict Court of Conejos County-Hon. John I. Palmer, Judge-
Affirmed.
FACTS: Espinoza sued the company for $800 on the death of his
daughter, Stella, under a family policy of insurance. The policy "in-
cludes all members of the immediate family named herein." It makes
but two exceptions, sons or daughters who marry are automatically ex-
cluded. If husband and wife separate, the company reserves the right,
"by sending them written notice" to cancel as to any or all members.
The parents did not separate, no attempt to cancel was made, and Stella
did not marry. The company contends that inasmuch as Stella had left
home and entered upon a course of training or probation preparatory to
becoming a Carmelite Nun, she was not a member of the family.
HELD: 1. The policy must be construed most strongly against
the company which wrote it, and the company's contention is without
merit.
2. If improper testimony is admitted in evidence, the court is pre-
sumed to have disregarded it.
3. If no objection was made to an order dispensing with the mo-
tion for a new trial, it cannot later be presumed to be prejudicial.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
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WILLS- ORAL AGREEMENTS TO MAKE WILLS -CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST-EQUITY-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-RESULTING TRUSTS
-PAROL TESTIMONY-MUTUAL WILLS-COSTS-Re: Estate of
Doerfer vs. Rolf et al.-No. 14040-Decided April 4, 1937-
District Court of Arapahoe County-Hon. H. E. Munson, Judge
-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where mutual or reciprocal wills have been made
pursuant to an oral agreement which has been executed by one of the
testators dying without having made any different testamentary disposi-
tion of his property and the other has accepted the benefits accruing to
him under the will of the deceased, the agreement becomes obligatory
upon the survivor or may be enforced in equity against his estate, not-
withstanding the fact that he has by will distributed the estate otherwise.
2. Where the caveat makes all of the formal allegations which
are required by Section 5211, C. L. 1921, by alleging objections of the
first class: those pertaining to the issue as to whether the will filed for
probate is the last will of the testator, as is the situation here, there is no
object in requiring the pleader to reaffirm, by reference or otherwise,
these formal matters and to properly plead the objections of the second
class: those relating to the legality of the contests of the will submitted.
3. Under Supreme Court Rule 8, an objection not presented to
the lower court in the motion for a new trial is in the Supreme Court
precluded. The Supreme Court must pass upon the cases brought to it
upon the basis of the record and proceedings in the trial court.
4. Where the evidence on a question is clear, convincing and un-
contradicted, the court, if it so desires, is justified in taking the question
from the jury and directing a verdict upon the issue.
5. Costs are properly taxed against the losing party.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
CONTRACT-MODIFICATION OF -- WAIVER -EVIDENCE-INSTRUC-
TIONS-JURY-DISPUTED QUESTIONS--Jensen vs. Bohm Me-
morial Co.-No. 13799-Decided April 5, 1937-County Court
of Dpnver-Hon. George A. Luxford, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error is seeking reversal of a judgment of
$1,100 entered against her in favor of defendant in error upon a jury
verdict. This amount was alleged to be due as the balance of the con-
tract price for a marble memorial statue placed in her home, upon her
order, by defendant in error. Herein reference will be made to the
parties as plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff was employed by defendant
upon written contract to erect in defendant's home a memorial of Italian
marble in likeness of a bronze statue located on the Mullen plot in
Mount Olivet Cemetery. $500 was paid at the execution of the agree-
ment, the balance of $1,100 to be paid upon completion of the work.
The contract provided that no modifications would be recognized unless
DICTA 325
the same is in writing, signed by the parties thereto. Subsequent modifi-
cations as to the statue, which were made at the defendant's request,
were written in the carbon copy of the original contract delivered to
defendant, and signed by Anton Bohm, president of the plaintiff com-
pany, but not signed by defendant. When the statue was placed in
defendant's home, she signed the following receipt: "One 'Christ' marble
statue, Received in good condition as per contract." Defendant at the
time said: "I think that it is a beautiful statue of 'Christ.' " The
evidence discloses that the statue and base were not of the exact dimen-
sions stipulated in the original contract. The modified contract upon
which plaintiff relies permitted some variation; the variation in the
statue was from one to three inches as to the height of the statue and
size of the base.
HELD: 1. The disputed question was submitted to the jury on
instructions which were manifestly fair, and their finding that the modi-
fied instrument was the ultimate contract between the parties; that de-
fendant waived the signing thereof; that she consented to the modifica-
tion; and that there was a full compliance by plaintiff with the terms of
the final contract, are conclusive in the matter.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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